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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
satisfaction of the builder's personal malice. Clearly the presence of malice
here would cause the courts of this state to hold that the use was unreason-
able and thus assert the superiority of the plaintiff's qualified right to light and
air. No prolonged inquiry into the motive of the builder is required. Unless
it appears that the structure is of economic benefit or reasonably necessary to
the beneficial enjoyment of the property, its construction or maintenance must
be either malicious or negligent.
It is often urged that malice can not make unlawful, that which is of its
essence lawful. This is the law of Pennsylvania. This rule is in no way in-
consistent with the law as interpreted above. Injury is of its essence unlaw-
ful. Factors which justify it in cases as the one under discussion, are eco-
nomic gain and necessity to the reasonable enjoyment of property. If the use
is unreasonable then the injury is unlawful. Malice here is but one of the
factors bearing upon the reasonableness of the use. Malice prevents the act
from being shown lawful rather than rendering the act unlawful.
The above then appears to be the state of the law in this Commonwealth
regarding the qualifying effect of malice or negligence upon a man's right to
enjoy his property. The great majority of the states condemn the Pennsyl-
vania view as unsound. It appears that the reasons advanced for rejecting
the Pennsylvania theory are based upon a misconception of the qualified
character of these rights and a misinterpretation of the effect given the presence
of malice or negligence upon those factors which qualify these rights.
Robert Lewis Blewitt.
CONSTRUCTION OF "DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY" EXEMPTION
CLAUSE IN INSURANCE POLICIES
The case of Runyon v. Western Life Ins. Co.1 presents an interesting
problem involving the construction of a clause exempting the insurance com-
pany from liability in certain situations. R took out a life insurance policy on his
own life which provided for double indemnity in case of accidental death un-
less "caused or attributed to as the result, directly or indirectly,2 of any viola-
tion of law by the insured." R was convicted of a felony and was sentenced
to the penitentiary. While there, serving as a cook, he was accidently
1192 N. E. 882 (Ohio).
2Italics added.
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burned and died of. these burns. The insurance company refused to pay the
beneficiary and, on suit, ifs position was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court.
The court found as the basis of its decision that R's violation of the law in-
directly caused his death.
This decision is startling and, on analysis, clearly appears to be erron-
eous. In the first place, it is well to remember that any insurance contract is
a speculative transaction. In return for an annual consideration, called the
premium, the company wagers the amount of the policy against the possibility
that the insured may die before he has paid in enough money to reimburse
the company when it is compelled to pay the face value. Ordinarily, specula-
tive contracts are illegal and the law will not intervene to enforce them.3 In-
surance contracts, because they serve a useful social purpose, are enforced by
the courts in spite of their speculative nature. To follow the ruling of the
Ohio court would be to remove from insurance much of the benefit which it
is intended to confer. Almost every act that a man does influences, to some
extent, his later conduct. In many cases, it could be shown that, at some time
in his life, the insured violated some law, and from that violation could be
traced a chain of events ending eventually in his death. The principal case
apparently would bar recovery in every such case, and thus the benefits of
insurance would be withheld from every man who had, at some time, violated
the law. Such a result is absurd. In fact, if the exemption clause recited is
to be so construed, it might well be declared illegal.
Regardless of the exact wording of the clause, it is settled that there
must be a causative connection between the violation of the law and the acci-
dental death in order to relieve the insurance company from liability. 4 This
raises the further question as to what degree of causation is required in order
for the exception to apply, and, in this connection, the terminology of the
clause becomes material.
Where the policy reads that the insurer shall not be liable for death
"caused by or while violating the law," or "in consequence of any violation or
attempt to violate any criminal law," it is settled that violation of the law
must be either the natural and probable5 or the proximate cause 6 of the death.
8Knight v. Press Co.. 227 Pa. 185, 187.
'17 A. L. R., 1005 note 14 R. C. L. 1226; Bloom v. Franklin Life Insurance Co., 97 Ind. 478;
Standard Life Fj Accident Insurance Co. v. Fraser, 76 Fed. 705.
5Empire Life Insurance Co. v. Einstein, 77 S. E. 209 (Ga.); Accident Ins. Co. v. Bennet,
16 S. W. 723 (Tenn.).
aKerr v. Minnesota Mutual Benefit Association, 39 N. W. 312 (Minn.); Conboy v. Ry.
Officials and Employees Accident Association, 46 N. E. 863 (Ind.); Southern Ins. Co. v.
Graham, 280 S. W. 30 (Tenn.).
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It is not the purpose of this note to determine which of these two rules is
adopted in Pennsylvania. The object in referring to these cases has been to
point out the extent of the insurer's liability where the term "directly" or its
equivalent is used in the exemption clause. The solution of our particular
problem hinges upon the construction given to the term "indirectly" used in
the clause under consideration, and upon which the principal case turns.
It is a general rule of construction, with regard to insurance policies, that
where there is any doubt as to the meaning of the terms in the policy on which
suit is brought, the construction of such terms should be resolved in favor of
the insured.7 In Doran v. Standard Life 6 Accident Ins. Co.. in discussing
an exemption clause using the word "indirectly," the court said: -
"The provision quoted from the policy excluded' liability from any
injury of which a violation of the law was the cause or condition pro-
ducing it. It also expressly provides exemption from liability where
violation of law is either the proximate or remote cause producing the
injury,
Though the court then found that the violation of the law there was the
proximate cause of the injury and, accordingly, laid down no test as to how
far it would go in protecting the insurer against death "remotely" caused by
the violation of the law, this excerpt indicates that the insurer does increase
its protection by the use of the term "indirectly". To what extent is the pro-
tection increased ?
The purpose of insurance companies in inserting such clauses in policies
is to protect themselves from the increased risk of death to the insured result-
ant upon the commission of a crimeY In view of this, it is submitted that the
insurance company is protected only in those situations where the death is
caused by an accident resulting from the increased risk attendant upon the
commission of a crime. This conclusion is supported by two cases. In
Manufacturer's Accident Indemnity Co. v. Dorgan," the insured, in his appli-
cation for his insurance, stated that he was aware that the insurance would
not extend to,
"Any bodily injury happening directly or indirectly in conse-
quence of disease or to death caused wholly or in part by bodily in-
TKrebs v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 249 Pa. 330; Nusbaum v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co., 276 Pa. 526.
963 Vt. 437, 22 A. 530, 13 L. R. A. 637.
GU. S. Bank & Trust Co. v. Switchmen's Union, 256 Pa. 228.
2058 Fed. 945.
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firmities or disease, or to any case where the accidental injury was not
the proximate and sole cause of death."
The facts were that the insured suffered a fit, as a result of which he fell into
a body of water and was drowned. Taft, J., said: -
"In our opinion, the adjective accidental' qualifies not only 'in-
juries' but 'death' and therefore an accidental death by drowning does
result from, and is caused indirectly by fits, vertigo or other disease,
if the fall into the water from which drowning ensues is caused by such
disease."11
This is a plain application of the "increased risk of death" doctrine.
In Coxe v. Employer's Corp.,1 2 the decision upon which the Runyan
case greatly relies, the court specifically found that the excepted act-war-
had placed the insured in a place of greater risk than if there had been no
war and, consequently, did not allow recovery. The court, by way of illus-
tration, said that if the insured had been killed by lightning while in camp, re-
covery could have been had, as lightning is not one of those unusual risks to
which war exposes a man.
The usefulness to the insurer of the word "indirectly" in the exemption
clause is illustrated by a comparison of the Dorgan case with Winespear v.
Insurance Co.- The facts of the two cases are the same. In both, the in-
sured suffered a fit, fell into a stream and was drowned. The exemption
clause in the English case provided that "it should not extend to any injury
caused by or arising from natural disease or weakness." The court found
that the proximate cause of the death was the drowning and allowed a re-
covery on the policy. In the Dorgan case, the court found that the term "in-
directly" extended the insurer's protection and, had there been no other ques-
tion involved there, would not have allowed recovery.
The rule advocated grants the insurer the protection which it seeks and
at the same time is not so far-reaching in its effect as to militate against the
public policy which insurance serves. Though we have referred to the rule
in connection with exemption clauses referring to violation of law, it may be




12(1916) 2 K. B. 629.
186 Q. B. Div. 42.
